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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Plaintiff-Appellant Aurora Credit Services, Inc. (wCAurora" or "Appellant") appeals 
from the trial court's September 19, 2006 Final Judgment against it and in favor of 
Defendants-Appellees Liberty West Development, Inc. ("Liberty West"), XM 
International ("XM") and Dennis W. Gay ("Mr. Gay") (collectively, "Defendants"). In 
particular, Aurora appeals the portion of the Final Judgment awarding trial court costs to 
Defendants pursuant to Utah Rule of Procedure 54. See R. at 3413-15. Aurora timely 
filed its Notice of Appeal on October 19, 2006. See R. at 3416-18. The Utah Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Defendants present the following statement of the issues and standards of review.1 
1. Did the trial court properly award trial court costs to Defendants in the 
amount of $1,785.02? 
a. Standard of Review. Although the award of costs generally is a 
matter within the trial court's discretion, Aurora correctly notes that, because it 
challenges the propriety of the award under Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the correction of error standard of review applies in this instance. See Lyon v. 
Burton, 2000 UT 19, ^  76 & n.18, 5 P.3d 616; Brief of Appellant ("Appellant's Br.") at 1. 
2. Did the trial court properly reject Aurora's unreasonable request for the 
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions in connection with Defendants' application for trial court 
Defendants do not contest that each of the following issues was properly preserved for 
appeal. 
1 
costs, particularly where the trial court granted Defendants' request over Aurora's formal, 
written objection? 
a. Standard of Review. Whether a Rule 11 violation has occurred is a 
question of law reviewed for correctness. See Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 204 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). However, a trial court's decision whether to impose sanctions under 
Rule 11 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 
171 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("We are mindful that Rule 11 gives trial courts great leeway to 
tailor the sanction to fit the requirements of the particular case."). 
3. Should this Court deny Aurora's unsupported request for sanctions against 
Defendants and their counsel under Rules 33, 34 and 40 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure?2 
a. Standard of Review. Because the decision whether to sanction a 
party under the Rules of Appellate Procedure lies with this Court in the first instance, no 
standard of review is applicable. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Rules 11 and 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules 33 and 40 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure are included as Exhibit "A" to the Addendum hereto. 
2
 Rule 34 is inapplicable to Aurora's request for sanctions. See Utah R. App. Proc. 34. 
Thus, the text of the rule is not included in the Addendum hereto. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Following Aurora's unsuccessful appeal to this Court, the denial of its Petition for 
Rehearing, and the Utah Supreme Court's rejection of its Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 
from the Utah Supreme Court, Aurora is back before the Court yet again. This time, 
Aurora challenges the trial court's award of $1,785.02 in costs incurred by XM in 
connection with the proceedings below. 
According to Aurora, Defendants are not entitled to an award of their trial court 
costs because, contrary to Rule 54(d)(2), they failed to submit a memorandum of costs 
''within five days after the entry of judgment." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2). Aurora also 
mistakenly contends that, because Defendants' request for their trial court costs was in 
ubad faith," the trial court should have imposed sanctions on Defendants pursuant to Rule 
11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Finally, Aurora seeks sanctions from this Court 
pursuant to Rules 33 and 40 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Aurora's appeal should be rejected, and the trial court's rulings should be 
affirmed. The trial court's award of costs to Defendants was correct in light of the plain 
language of Rule 54(d), which easily can be read to support the submission of a 
memorandum of costs after an appeal is completed, so long as the memorandum is 
submitted within five days of the entry of the final judgment resolving the case. 
The trial court also properly declined to assess Rule 11 sanctions against 
Defendants. Indeed, in awarding costs to Defendants, the trial court itself accepted 
Defendants' reading of Rule 54(d), which alone signifies that no Rule 11 violation 
3 
occurred. Further, Defendants' request for costs was based upon a logical and correct 
reading of Rule 54(d). Although Utah case law generally provides that Rule 54(d) 
requires the submission of a memorandum of costs within five days of the entry of a 
judgment from which an appeal is taken, no Utah case has addressed the exact scenario 
presented here, and both the plain language of Rule 54(d) and case law from other 
jurisdictions support Defendants' reading. Thus, Defendants did not violate Rule 11, and 
they certainly did not submit their memorandum of costs in bad faith. 
Finally, this Court should decline to sanction Defendants under the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Aurora is the appellant in this case, and Defendants are merel) 
responding to Aurora's appeal. As such, the terms of Rules 33 and 40 are inapplicable. 
In addition, Defendants' contentions were not frivolous, and Defendants have not made 
any argument for any improper purpose. Thus, even if Aurora's request for sanctions 
was proper, sanctions against Defendants are plainly unwarranted. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
This case has traveled through a lengthy and complex procedural history, 
including an interlocutory appeal in 1998, see Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty West 
Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1998) {"Aurora F), in which the Utah Supreme Court 
reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Defendants, concluding that the 
trial court had erred in dismissing Aurora's direct shareholder claims and in granting 
Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on Aurora's derivative claims. See 
Aurora /, 970 P.2d at 1282. 
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With respect to Aurora's derivative claims, the Utah Supreme Court held that, 
although Aurora lacked standing to bring the derivative claims under the traditional 
contemporaneous ownership doctrine, there were genuine issues of material fact as to 
whether Aurora had standing by virtue of the "fraudulent concealment exception" to the 
doctrine. See id. at 1279. Due to the factual nature of this inquiry, the Utah Supreme 
Court remanded to the trial court for a determination of whether the fraudulent 
concealment exception applied. See id. Because Aurora would only have standing if the 
fraudulent concealment exception were satisfied, documents and evidence regarding 
Defendants' representations to Aurora at and after the time when Aurora claims to have 
become a shareholder of Liberty West became critically important to the case. 
With respect to Aurora's direct claims, the court held that minority shareholders of 
closely held corporations may proceed directly against corporate officers where the 
shareholder suffered an injury "distinct from that suffered by the corporation." Id. at 
1280. However, the court went on to hold that, just as with derivative actions, the 
minority shareholder must meet the contemporaneous ownership standard of Rule 23.1. 
See id. at 1280-81. Accordingly, the question on remand was the same as for the 
derivative claims, namely, whether Aurora could pursue its direct claims based upon the 
fraudulent concealment exception to the contemporaneous ownership rule. See id. at 
1281. Thus, as with the derivative claims, documents and evidence regarding the 
fraudulent concealment issue became vital. 
Following remand, the parties recommenced their discovery efforts. See, e.g., R. 
at 674, 696, 868. On October 19, 2001, Defendants again moved for summary judgment, 
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this time on the basis that Aurora had not met its burden to establish the fraudulent 
concealment exception to the contemporaneous ownership rule. See R. at 1140. The 
court denied the motion by Memorandum Decision and Order on August 1, 2002, 
specifically emphasizing that summary judgment was inappropriate due to questions of 
fact on the issue of "whether 'affirmative steps to conceal wrongdoing' from [Aurora] 
were undertaken" between April 1993, when Aurora claims to have foreclosed on its 
interest in Liberty West stock, and July 1993, when Aurora learned of a prior foreclosure 
sale. SeeR. at 1304, 1306. 
On December 4, 2002, in accordance with the court's denial of their motion for 
summary judgment, Defendants served a second set of discovery requests (the "Second 
Set of Requests"). See R. at 1384. Among other documents and information, the Second 
Set of Requests formally sought certain information that Aurora's counsel had previously 
promised but failed to provide to Defendants, including (1) handwritten notes taken by 
Aurora's president, Charles N. Zak, of his conversations with Mr. Gay and others, which 
Mr. Zak explicitly stated were in existence and his counsel promised to produce, albeit in 
redacted form, at Mr. Zak's deposition on January 23, 2001, see R. at 1481, 1519, 1532-
33; (2) a complete copy of Aurora's first set of document production, which Aurora's 
counsel had also agreed to provide, see R. at 1480-81, 1519; and (3) a thorough 
explanation of Aurora's claims, including identification and clarification of each claim 
and the evidence supporting each claim, which Aurora also had previously promised to 
provide. See R. at 1481, 1507-08. Incredibly, despite the prior agreements of Aurora's 
6 
counsel to produce the information, Aurora refused to produce the information in 
response to the Second Set of Requests. 
Defendants served the Second Set of Requests by mail on Aurora's counsel at 
2258 South Wilshire Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84109. See R. at 1383, 1385. As 
Defendants later discovered, this address contained a single-digit typographical error -
the correct address is apparently 2558 South Wilshire Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
84109. Despite the error in the address, Aurora's counsel admitted that he received the 
Second Set of Requests about one week after they were mailed to him, by approximately 
December 11, 2003. See R. at 1569. 
Defendants heard nothing from Aurora regarding the Second Set of Requests until 
January 10, 2003 - four days after the due date - when Aurora's counsel informed 
Defendants that Aurora did not intend to respond to the Second Set of Requests at all. 
'See R. at 1478, 1524. Instead, Aurora planned to move to strike the Second Set of 
Requests on the basis of a prior trial court order, which it claimed precluded Defendants 
from conducting any further discovery. See id. 
On January 14, 2003, having received no response to the Second Set of Requests, 
Defendants moved to compel. See R. at 1534. As Defendants explained in the 
memorandum supporting the motion, Aurora not only refused to respond to the Second 
Set of Requests but also failed to file any objection to the requests and failed to move for 
a protective order. See R. at 1476. Instead, on January 16, 2003, ten days after the 
responses were due, Aurora filed a motion to strike the Second Set of Requests. Aurora 
argued that a prior court order prohibited Defendants from conducting additional 
7 
discovery and that Defendants' decision to propound the requests was contrary to prior 
representations made in the litigation. See R. at 1539. Aurora did not make any mention 
of or otherwise refer to the service of the Second Set of Requests in its motion to strike. 
In fact, Aurora did not raise this issue until January 27, 2003, when it filed its opposition 
to the motion to compel and argued for the first time that it was not required to respond to 
the Second Set of Requests because it was mailed to the wrong address. See R. at 1574. 
The trial court held a hearing on Defendants' motion to compel and Aurora's 
motion to strike, among other motions, on March 26, 2003, more than three months after 
Defendants' service of the Second Set of Requests. See R. at 3347. Among other things, 
the court considered and rejected the argument that the Second Set of Requests had been 
improperly served. See R. at 3347, p. 32. The court further ruled as follows: 
Here's what I'm going to do in this matter. I am going to allow 
additional discovery by the defendants in this matter to the plaintiffs. I'm 
also going to allow plaintiffs additional time in this matter. All discovery 
in this case will be completed sixty days from today's date. Operative word 
is completed, gentlemen. This case is almost as old as my children. 
R. at 3347, pp. 33-34. 
Defendants submitted a proposed order on these rulings, and Aurora 
characteristically took the opportunity to re-argue its positions by objecting to the "form" 
of the order. In reality, Aurora's objection was to the order's substance, not its form. 
Among other things, Aurora claimed that the court did not grant Defendant's motion to 
compel but instead simply stated that it would "allow additional discovery by 
defendants." R. at 1713-14. The trial court rejected Aurora's objections and entered 
Defendants' proposed order, with certain minor changes, on April 8, 2003: 
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Defendants' Motion to Compel is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs Motion to 
Strike is DENIED. Plaintiff Aurora Credit Services, Inc. will respond to 
Defendants' Second Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff and Defendants' 
Second Set of Requests for Production of Documents, within thirty (30) 
days from April 18,2003. 
R. at 1751. Although Defendants' original proposed order stated that Aurora must 
respond to the Second Set of Requests within thirty days from the hearing date, i.e., 
March 26, 2003, the court scratched out that date and replaced it with April 18, 2003, 
providing Aurora with about three additional weeks - through May 18, 2003 - to respond 
to the Second Set of Requests. See R. at 1751. The court also imposed a deadline for the 
completion of all discovery within sixty days from March 26, 2003. See R. at 1752. 
Rather than simply complying with the April 8 Order by responding to the Second 
Set of Requests by May 18, 2003, Aurora filed a flurry of other motions and papers. On 
May 5, 2003, Aurora moved the court to appoint a special master to deal with the 
discovery issues in the case. See R. at 1790. On May 12, 2003, Aurora moved for a 
protective order to delay the deposition of Aurora's President, Charles F. Zak (uMr. 
Zak"), which was then noticed for May 15, 2003. See R. at 1798. On the same day, 
Aurora filed a document entitled "Motion to Toll Discovery Deadline for Period of 
Special Master's Review of Discovery Issues and Request for Immediate Hearing," R. at 
1803, asking the trial court to extend the sixty-day discovery period. 
Aurora did serve a set of written responses to the Second Set of Requests on May 
7, 2003. See R. at 1794-95. These "responses," however, provided extremely little 
information in response to Defendants' interrogatories, and they refused to produce even 
a single document, including the handwritten notes of Mr. Zak. See R. at 1936-1954. 
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Defendants filed a motion for Rule 37 sanctions on May 22, 2003. See R. at 1809, 
arguing that Aurora's written responses were severely deficient and amounted to a 
violation of the April 8 Order. Contrary to the express requirements of the Order, Aurora 
had failed to produce Mr. Zak's handwritten notes, failed to provide a copy of its first set 
of document production, and failed to identify or clarify its claims. See R. at 1915. 
The hearing on the motion for sanctions did not occur until May 5, 2004, and, 
although the briefing on each of Defendants' May 22, 2003 motions was finally 
completed by February 6, 2004, see R. at 2134, Aurora failed to take advantage of the 
interim period. Instead producing the requested documents, moving for an extension of 
time, providing a privilege log, or moving for a protective order, for example, Aurora 
filed yet another round of motions, including a forty-five page motion to strike an 
affidavit, see R. at 2389, and a motion for partial summary judgment on the issues of 
standing and liability for "various claims of plaintiff herein." R. at 2551. Following the 
hearing, the trial court took the motion for sanctions under advisement. See R. at 2380. 
On June 10, 2004, the court issued a minute entry imposing two sanctions on 
Aurora for failing to comply with its Order and Defendants' discovery requests. See R. at 
3261. First, due to its failure to produce the responsive information, Aurora would be 
precluded from using or relying upon any testimony related to the alleged conversations 
between Mr. Zak and Mr. Gay. See R. at 3261-62. Second, the court dismissed Aurora's 
Second Amended Complaint, stating that Aurora had failed "to identify its claims and 
evidence in support thereof." R. at 3262. Describing the basis for these sanctions, the 
minute entry stated: 
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On April 8, 2003 this Court entered an Order granting defendants' Motion 
to Compel and denying plaintiffs Motion to Strike. Consistent with its 
Order, the court explicitly required plaintiff Aurora to respond to 
defendants' second set of interrogatories and second set of requests for 
production of documents within thirty (30) days, with discovery to be 
completed in sixty (60) days. Plaintiff has failed to do so. To this day, 
Aurora Credit has failed, in direct contravention of the Court's Order, to 
provide defendants with basic documents and information crucial to its 
defense of this case: the handwritten notes of Charles Zak regarding 
conversations with James Hogle, Tony Versteeg and Lonnie Anderson, 
relevant documents taken from Liberty West Development by a former 
employee, and identification of and basis for the claims alleged. 
R. at 3261 (emphasis added). Addressing the argument that Aurora adequately responded 
to the Second Set of Requests by filing its "response" thereto on May 7, 2003, the court 
stated: 
While the Court recognizes that on May 7, 2003 Aurora served defendants 
with "written responses", such responses were wholly inadequate. 
Additionally, Aurora refused to produce the requested documentation 
imperative to defendants' defense. 
R. at 3261, n.l (emphasis added). An Order reflecting the findings and conclusions set 
forth in the minute entry was entered on July 13, 2004. See R. at 3276. 
In typical fashion, Aurora filed yet another motion to "alter or amend" following 
the entry of the July 13, 2004 Order. See R. at 3280. On November 10, 2004, after the 
motion had been fully briefed by the parties, the trial court denied Aurora's motion. See 
R. at 3328-29. Aurora timely appealed from the trial court's denial of the motion to alter 
or amend. See R. at 3331. 
On February 16, 2006, this Court affirmed the trial court's entry of sanctions, 
holding that "the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Aurora's second 
amended complaint with prejudice pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(C)." See Aurora Credit 
11 
Servs., Inc. v. Liberty West Dev., Inc., 2006 UT App 48, \ 11, 129 P.3d 287. Aurora filed 
a petition for rehearing, but the Court denied the petition on March 8, 2006. Aurora next 
sought a writ of certiorari from the Utah Supreme Court, but that request was also denied. 
See R. at 3361. This Court remitted the case to the trial court on June 2, 2006. See R. at 
3350-51. 
Following the Remittitur, Defendants submitted a Motion for Entry of Final 
Judgment, a Verified Memorandum of Costs and a Verified Bill of Costs on Appeal. See 
R. at 3372-94, 3368-71, and 3364-67, respectively. Aurora objected to each of 
Defendants' filings, challenging both the propriety and amount of trial court costs sought 
by Defendants, and the amount of costs sought by Defendants in connection with the 
appeal. See R. at 3399-3404. Aurora also requested the trial court to issue Rule 11 
sanctions against Defendants. See id. On September 19, 2006, the trial court rejected 
Aurora's arguments and entered a Final Judgment, awarding Defendants $1,785.02 in 
trial court costs and $322.32 in appellate costs. See R. at 3413-15. Aurora timely filed a 
notice of appeal on October 19, 2006. See R. at 3416-18. 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants Dennis Gay, James Hogle Jr. ("Mr. Hogle"), and two other individuals 
formed Liberty West in 1986 for the purpose of developing commercial real estate. See 
R. at 1156 f 3. Liberty West borrowed money to develop an office building in Ogden, 
Utah (the "Ogden Property"), which was secured by a note and mortgage on the property. 
Because the March 8, 2006 Order denying the Petition for Rehearing is not included in 
the record, it is included in the Addendum hereto as Exhibit "B". 
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See R. at 1156 ^ 4-5. After construction of the property was completed, it was leased to 
the Internal Revenue Service. See R. at 222 f^ 5. 
In 1989, Liberty West was having financial difficulties, including being unable to 
make the payments due on the Ogden Property, and numerous liens had been placed 
against the Ogden Property. See R. at 1156 Tf 7. In early 1991, a creditor of Liberty West 
named Restaurant Store & Equipment Supply Company, Inc. ("Restaurant Store") sued 
Liberty West for nonpayment on a contract and obtained a monetary judgment against it. 
See R. at 1157 ^ 11. Restaurant Store then obtained a Writ of Execution and, on April 24, 
1991, the Weber County Sheriff recorded a levy on the Ogden Property with the Weber 
County Recorder's Office. See R. at 1157-58, U 11. 
On May 15, 1991, pursuant to the Writ of Execution, the Weber County Sheriff 
conducted a sheriffs sale of the Ogden Property, at which Restaurant Store was the 
highest bidder. See R. at 1157-57, f^ 11. The Weber County Sheriff therefore issued a 
certificate of the sale to Restaurant Store, which was recorded with the Weber County 
Recorder on June 3, 1993. See R. at 1144-45 % 6; R. at 1168. 
On May 20, 1991, XM, which at the time was a general partnership owned jointly 
by Mr. Gay and an individual named George Bybee, purchased the Ogden Property from 
Restaurant Store. See R. at 1158 ^ 12. Although Restaurant Store did not execute a quit 
claim deed to XM until June 3, 2003, see R. at 1158 |^ 13, XM has been the equitable and 
beneficial owner of the Property since May 20, 1991. See R. at 1158 [^ 12; see also R. at 
29-30. 
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Liberty West's redemption period for the Ogden Property expired on November 
15, 1991, six months after the execution sale at which Restaurant Store purchased the 
property. See R. at 290 j^ 3. However, Liberty West's shareholders ultimately 
determined not to redeem the Ogden Property. Among other factors affecting this 
decision was the discovery of a major underground petroleum contamination from a 
neighboring manufacturing plant. See R. at 1158 f^ 15. 
In the late 1980s, Hogle was sued in another state for an unrelated debt owed to 
Union National Bank of Chicago ("UNBC"), which obtained a monetary judgment 
against him (the "Hogle Judgment"). See R. at 1157 f^ 8. UNBC's assets, including the 
Hogle Judgment, were subsequently assumed by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation ("FDIC"). See R. at 1157 ^ 8. On February 20, 1991, Mr. Hogle executed a 
security agreement in favor of the FDIC, in which he pledged his 2,500 shares of Liberty 
West stock as collateral for the judgment. See R. at 1157, 2137. To perfect this security 
interest, Mr. Hogle transferred possession of the Liberty West stock to the FDIC. On 
November 21, 1990, Mr. Gay, then-president of Liberty West, sent the unendorsed Hogle 
Shares certificates to the FDIC together with another document signed by Hogle entitled 
"Irrevocable Stock or Bond Power" confirming the FDIC's security interest in the Hogle 
Shares. See R. at 1157 ^ 9. 
On November 22, 1991, Aurora, whose primary business is acquiring assets from 
the FDIC, the Resolution Trust Corporation and other financial institutions for collection, 
see R. at 356, purchased a package of assets, which included the Hogle Judgment, from 
the FDIC at a judgment auction. See R. at 74 f^ 6. However, Aurora did not become a 
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shareholder of Liberty West until April, 1993, when it foreclosed on the Liberty West 
stock. SeeR. at 290 H 5. 
In 1993, nearly two years after the 1991 foreclosure sale, Aurora purported to 
foreclose on its security interest in the Liberty West stock. At approximately the same 
time, Aurora somehow developed an after-the-fact belief that the 1991 foreclosure was 
improper. Aurora filed suit against Defendants in 1994 based upon this ill-conceived 
theory. See R. at 1-10. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Aurora's appeal arises from the trial court's award of $1,785.02 in costs to 
Defendants for expenses they incurred in connection with the trial court proceedings. 
According to Aurora, the trial court's award was improper because Defendants' 
memorandum of costs was untimely under Rule 54. Further, even though Defendants 
prevailed on the issue below, Aurora claims that the trial court erred by failing to impose 
Rule 11 sanctions against Defendants for their allegedly untimely request for costs, which 
Aurora contends was in bad faith. Finally, Aurora asks this Court to enter sanctions 
against Defendants pursuant to Rules 33 and 40 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Aurora's arguments are without merit. 
First, the trial court's award of costs should be affirmed because it was based upon 
a reasonable and correct interpretation of Rule 54(d). Although the language of Rule 
54(d)(2) indicates that a memorandum of costs should be filed "within five days after the 
Aurora does not challenge the amount of the award. Instead, Aurora claims solely that 
the award was improper under Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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entry of judgment," the language of Rule 54(d)(1) calls into question the applicability of 
this requirement in cases where an appeal has been filed. Recent case law supports this 
interpretation. 
Second, the trial court correctly determined that no Rule 11 violation occurred, 
and therefore appropriately declined to impose sanctions against Defendants. 
Defendants' arguments in support of the request for costs meritorious, and the arguments 
were accepted by the trial court. Sanctions are inappropriate for this reason alone. 
Finally, because Aurora is the party that filed this appeal, not Defendants, there is 
also no basis for sanctions under Rules 33 or 40, which by their plain terms are 
inapplicable to this case. In addition, the Court should not award sanctions because 
Defendants' arguments are not frivolous or brought for any improper purpose. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE AWARD OF TRIAL COURT COSTS TO DEFENDANTS WAS 
PROPER UNDER RULE 54(d) AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE 
AFFIRMED 
The trial court's award to Defendants of their costs incurred in connection with the 
proceedings below was correct under a reasonable and appropriate interpretation of Rule 
54(d). As such, Aurora's arguments should be rejected, and the trial court's award 
should be affirmed. 
A. Defendants' Reading of Rule 54(d) Harmonizes Its Subsections and Is 
Supported by Case Law 
Aurora contends that Rule 54(d)(2) unvaryingly requires a party entitled to trial 
court costs to file a memorandum of costs within five days from "entry of final 
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judgment." Appellant's Br. at 5. Aurora further claims that the only judgment to which 
this language may apply is the "judgment" from which an appeal may be taken, even if 
there remain outstanding issues for determination. While Aurora's reading of the rule 
may apply in certain circumstances, Aurora fails to account for situations involving 
appeals, and its interpretation fails to harmonize the two subsections of Rule 54(d). 
The trial court properly interpreted Rule 54(d) as a whole, reading subsections 
(1) and (2) so as to harmonize their application in cases involving appeals. Specifically, 
while Rule 54(d)(2) states that a prevailing party must serve and file a memorandum of 
costs "within five days after the entry of judgment," Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2), Rule 
54(d)(1) strongly indicates that, when the losing party commences an appeal, the 
"judgment" does not become "final" for purposes of awarding costs until after the appeal 
is concluded. In particular, Rule 54(d)(1) signifies that "final determination" of a case 
will not occur until after the conclusion an appeal, at which time costs shall be awarded: 
[C]osts shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court 
otherwise directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding 
for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with 
such appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final 
determination of the cause. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) (emphasis added). Read in conjunction with Rule 54(d)(2), Rule 
54(d)(1) indicates that, in cases where an appeal is taken, the judgment from which an 
award of costs is made is not entered until after the appeal. Under this reasonable and 
appropriate interpretation of Rule 54(d), the trial court's award of costs to Defendants 
was correct and should be affirmed. Case law from other jurisdictions supports this 
interpretation. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Horkheimer, 901 So.2d 329, 
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331 (holding that time for filing application for attorney fees and costs began to run upon 
entry of "new final judgment upon remand"); see also Litty v Becker, 656 A.2d 365, 369 
(Md. App. 1995) (stating that, in the absence of a strict time requirement for filing a 
request for costs, "it may often be prudent for a party to delay filing such a motion until 
the appeal has been concluded, to avoid presenting an issue that need no longer be 
decided" (emphasis added)). 
Moreover, whether or not a "judgment" triggering the five-day period had been 
entered prior to the appeal, the trial court's entry of discovery sanctions on Aurora made 
it clear that Defendants were the prevailing parties below. As such, costs were to be 
awarded to Defendants "as a matter of course," Utah R. Civ. Proc. 54(d)(1), leaving only 
the amount of the award for a subsequent determination. To the extent the five-day 
requirement for a memorandum of costs is intended to serve the purpose of notifying the 
opposing party that costs would be sought, the memorandum of costs was therefore a 
non-issue. See Chamizo v. Forman, 933 So.2d 1240, 1241 (Fla. App. 2006); accord 
Hinson v. Holt, 776 So.2d 804, 813 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998) ("Because *[t]he assessment of 
costs is merely incidental to the judgment and may be done at any time prior to issuance 
of execution, we conclude that a motion for costs pursuant to Rule 54(d), Ala. R. Civ. P., 
may properly be ruled upon by the trial court at any time before the issuance of 
execution, regardless of the pendency of an appeal." (citation omitted)). 
In Chamizo, the judgment at issue expressly provided that the prevailing party 
would be awarded costs and attorney fees, leaving the determination of the amount for a 
later date. See id. at 1240-41. However, as in this case, the prevailing party did not file a 
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memorandum of costs until after the thirty-day period applicable under the Florida rules 
had expired. Because it was a foregone conclusion that the prevailing party would, in 
fact, receive an award of fees - as it was in this case - the appellate court properly ruled 
that the timeliness of the memorandum of costs was a "non-issue." Id. at 1241. This 
Court should do the same. Aurora was on notice by the plain terms of Rule 54(d)(1) that 
Defendants were entitled to costs. Defendants' filing of the memorandum of costs 
following the appeal and the trial court's entry of the Final Judgment was timely, and 
Aurora suffered no prejudice as a result. 
Because the trial court properly awarded costs to Defendants under a reasonable 
interpretation of Rule 54(d), its award of costs should be affirmed. 
B. The Utah Cases Relied Upon by Aurora Are Distinguishable, and the 
Question Presented Here Is a Matter of First Impression 
Despite the fact that Utah case law generally interprets Rule 54(d)(2) to require a 
memorandum of costs to be filed within five days of a "judgment" entered prior to an 
appeal, no Utah court has addressed the fact pattern in this case, where a Final Judgment 
was entered and a memorandum of costs was filed after the appeal was concluded. 
Accordingly, the cases relied upon by Aurora are distinguishable. 
For example, Defendants acknowledge that the primary case relied upon by 
Aurora, Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, 5 P.3d 616, suggests there are no circumstances in 
which a prevailing party who fails to file a memorandum of costs within five days of the 
entry of "judgment" can ever obtain costs. See id. ^ j 77-78. However, unlike in Lyon, 
where the trial court definitively entered a "judgment" on a date certain, see id. ]f 77, and 
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unlike cases in which a party obtains a judgment for damages or some other form of 
affirmative relief, in this case there was no judgment per se - there was an order entering 
the discovery sanctions of (1) striking Aurora's complaint and (2) precluding Aurora 
from using any evidence related to the discovery it failed to produce to XM. See R. at 
3276. This Order was followed by another order denying one of Aurora's many motions 
to "alter or amend" the discovery sanction Order. See R. at 3328-29. 
Further, whereas in Lyon the prevailing party filed its memorandum of costs 
approximately sixteen days after the trial court's judgment, but still prior to the appeal, 
see Lyon, 2000 UT 19, \ 11, in this case Defendants filed their memorandum after the 
conclusion of the appeal. The same is true of the other Utah cases cited by Aurora. See, 
e.g., Brown v. Jorgensen, 2006 UT 168, \ 27, 136 P.3d 1252 (reversing costs award 
where there was no memorandum of costs was filed); Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. New 
York Terminal Warehouse Co., 350 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1960) (reversing award of costs 
where prevailing party submitted timely unverified memorandum of costs, but unverified 
memorandum was filed several days after expiration of five-day deadline); In re Sheville, 
2003 UT App 141, f 2 & n.2, 71 P.3d 179 (reversing costs award where memorandum of 
costs was filed approximately a month after order of guardianship was entered); see also 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 318 (Utah 1998) (holding that costs award was 
improper where memorandum of costs was filed nineteen days after entry of judgment).5 
5
 In another case relied upon by Aurora, Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, 44 P.3d 781, the 
costs award was reversed because the judgment was reversed, so the party who prevailed 
below was no longer entitled to costs as the "prevailing party." Id., 2002 UT 33, fflf 46-
48. Thus, the issue here was also not considered by the court in Ault. 
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Thus, unlike in this case, in the cases relied upon by Aurora, there was no dispute about 
whether a "final judgment" - or, in the language of Rule 54(d)(1), a "final determination" 
- had been entered, and the issue was therefore not before those courts. 
Indeed, only one Utah case has addressed the language of Rule 54(d)(1) at issue 
here, i.e., "costs of the action . . . shall abide the final determination of the cause," Utah 
R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1), and it supports Defendants' interpretation. See Benjamin v. Arnica 
Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 UT 37, ffif 38-39, 140 P.3d 1210. In Benjamin, the Supreme Court 
addressed an interlocutory appeal from a grant of summary judgment requiring the 
defendant insurer to defend and indemnify the plaintiff in a lawsuit filed against him by 
two coworkers. See id. fflf 1-2. Considering the insurance company's request for costs on 
appeal, the Supreme Court denied the request but instructed the trial court to evaluate the 
issue "when the case is finally resolved and it can identify the prevailing party." Id. % 39 
(emphasis added). The Supreme Court explained: 
This is an interlocutory appeal; final judgment has yet to be entered. Under 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), an award of costs is to be given to 
the "prevailing party" and is to "abide the final determination of the cause." 
In interpreting this provision, we embrace the rule promulgated by the 
Arizona Supreme Court: "Unless provided by statute, there shall be no 
application for costs or attorneys' fees made in connection with a petition 
for review by interlocutory appeal. [I]ssues of costs and attorneys fees, if 
any, shall abide the final resolution of the adjudication." 
Benjamin, 2006 UT 37, % 39 (quoting In Re Rights to the Use of the Gila River, 830 P.2d 
443, 458 (Ariz. 1992)). 
Although this case does not involve an interlocutory appeal, the Benjamin court's 
reasoning is applicable - because no "final determination" had been entered prior to the 
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appeal, a memorandum of costs was not required until after the case was remitted and the 
Final Judgment was entered. Indeed, the portion of the Order appealed from in this case 
sanctioned Aurora both by dismissing its claims and by precluding it from relying upon 
certain evidence at trial, see R. at 3276, strongly suggesting that post-appeal proceedings 
were within the contemplation of both the trial court and the parties. 
Moreover, in this case the Court of Appeals specifically remitted the case back to 
the trial court and, consistent with Benjamin, Defendants then requested the trial court to 
"finally determine" the case by entry of a final judgment. At the same time, Defendants 
asked the trial court to include in that judgment its costs on appeal, which were awarded 
by this Court, but the amount of which was to be determined by the trial court. This is 
precisely the type of award and "final determination" contemplated by Rule 54(d)(1). 
Because the trial court correctly awarded costs to Defendants, the judgment in this 
matter should be affirmed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DECLINED TO IMPOSE RULE 11 
SANCTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANTS 
According to Aurora, the trial court erred by refusing to impose sanctions against 
Defendants under Rule 11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Aurora's argument should be 
rejected for numerous reasons. 
A, The Trial Court Correctly Determined that No Rule 11 Violation 
Occurred 
Aurora contends that Defendants violated Rule 11(b)(2) because they improperly 
certified to the court that their arguments "were warranted by existing law or by a 
nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law, or the 
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establishment of new law." Utah R. Civ. Proc. 11(b)(2). To the contrary, as set forth 
above, Defendants reasonably believed, based upon a reasonable investigation, that their 
claim for costs was "warranted by existing law." Based upon the language of Rule 
54(d)(1), Defendants concluded that a final judgment had yet to be entered after the 
appeal was remitted, as awards for both trial court costs and appellate costs remained for 
disposition. If the trial court found Defendants arguments sufficiently reasoned and well-
founded to grant their request for costs, the arguments should certainly not be subject to 
Rule 11 scrutiny. 
Aurora also asserts that Defendants filed their motion for entry of a final judgment 
in "bad faith," Appellant's Br. at 12, and that they did so in an attempt "to mislead the 
trial court." Id. at 11. These assertions should be summarily rejected. As indicated 
above, Defendants founded their arguments on the language of Rule 54(d) itself, and on 
their understanding that a "final" judgment had not yet been entered. Aurora's assertion 
that Defendants attempted to pull the wool over the trial court's eyes gives the trial court 
too little credit. In short, the trial court correctly determined that no Rule 11 violation 
occurred. 
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Declining to Impose 
Sanctions 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to impose Rule 11 
sanctions. Whether to impose sanctions is a matter within the trial court's discretion, see 
Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, 1235 (Utah 1992), and the rule itself indicates that 
sanctions are not always necessary. See Utah R. Civ. P. 11(c) ("If, after notice and a 
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reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that subdivision (b) has been 
violated, the Court may . . . impose an appropriate sanction . . . .") (emphasis added). 
In this case, the alleged violation - even assuming there was one - was not 
sufficiently severe to justify sanctions. "Factual errors or misstatements 'must be 
significant'" to warrant Rule 11 sanctions. K.F.K. v. T. W., 2005 UT App 85, f 4, 110 
P.3d 162 (quoting Morse v. Packer, 2000 UT 86,% 28, 15 P.3d 1021) (affirming trial 
court's conclusion that party did not violate Rule 11). Defendants sought and received 
$1,785.02 in costs. Defendants' arguments were made in good faith, were not made for 
any improper purpose, and Defendants had no intention to deceive anyone, let alone the 
trial court. Sanctions are an unusual remedy reserved for egregious situations. See, e.g., 
Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1998) (affirming award of 
$15,000 in attorney fees as Rule 11 sanction for knowingly filing complaint including 
excessive medical fees for purpose of forcing payment excessive attorney fees); In re 
Adoption of R.N.I, 913 P.2d 761, 764-65 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (affirming award of 
attorney fees where attorney petitioned court for adoption knowing biological mother had 
challenged consent and without inquiring as to whether biological father would have 
consented to adoption); cf Morse v. Packer, 2000 UT 86, Tf 28, 15 P.3d 1021 
("[Sanctions will not be imposed when they are not critical and the surrounding 
circumstances indicate that counsel did conduct a reasonable inquiry."). No sanction is 
warranted here as Aurora has failed to make any showing that Defendants engaged in any 
egregious conduct or otherwise acted improperly. 
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In short, the trial court's determination that no Rule 11 violation occurred should 
be affirmed, as should its determination that Rule 11 sanctions were not warranted. 
III. THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS ON 
APPEAL BECAUSE DOING SO WOULD BE PROCEDURALLY 
IMPROPER, AND DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENTS ARE WELL-FOUNDED 
Aurora asks this Court to sanction Defendants pursuant to Rules 33 and 40 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. However, by its clear terms, Rule 33 permits 
damages to be awarded only for "a motion made or appeal taken under these rules that is 
either frivolous or for delay." Utah R. App. Proc. 33(a) (emphasis added). Defendants 
have not made any motion nor have they taken an appeal under the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, so the rule is inapplicable on its face. Further, even if the rule were 
applicable, none of the arguments presented by Defendants to the trial court or this Court 
is frivolous, as discussed above, nor were any of Defendants' arguments made for the 
purpose of delaying any proceedings. Sanctions are therefore unwarranted under Rule 
33. See Beddoes v. Giffin, 2006 UT App 130, 2006 WL 929112, at * 1 (denying request 
for sanctions under Rule 33 where appellant's arguments were liberally construed as 
"good faith arguments for modification of existing case law"). 
With respect to Rule 40, there are also no grounds for the imposition of sanctions. 
As with Rule 33, Defendants are simply responding to Aurora's appeal - they have not 
made any unsupported motions, appeals or otherwise taken any improper action under the 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. In addition, as discussed above, Defendants' positions are 
reasonable and well-founded, and these positions were accepted by the trial court. 
Defendants' counsel has provided adequate assistance and representation to Defendants, 
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has not "engaged in conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar/' and has not violated any 
rule or order of the Court. See Utah R. App. Proc. 40(b). As such, Aurora's request for 
sanctions should be denied.6 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons set forth above, Defendants respectfully ask the Court to 
affirm the award of trial court costs and the trial court's refusal to enter Rule 11 sanctions 
in this matter. Defendants further request the Court to deny Aurora's request for 
sanctions on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of March 2007. 
MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD, P.C. 
rc~—s-*^ 
James E. Magleby 
Christine T. Greenwood 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees Liberty 
West Development, Inc., XM International, and 
Dennis W. Gay 
6
 Defendants note that Aurora did not provide any notice of its intent to seek sanctions 
prior to commencing this appeal. Nevertheless, if the Court sees fit to consider the 
imposition of sanctions on Defendants or their counsel, Defendants hereby request a 
hearing on the issue in accordance with Rule 40(b). 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of March 2007,1 caused to be mailed, by 
United States first-class mail, two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEES LIBERTY WEST DEVELOPMENT, INC., XM INTERNATIONAL 
AND DENNIS W. GAY to the following: 
Eric P. Hartman, Esq. 
2558 South Wilshire Circle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Attorney for Appellant Aurora 




Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; representations to 
court; sanctions. 
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by at 
least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or, if the party is not 
represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party. Each paper shall state the 
signer's address and telephone number, if any. Except when otherwise specifically 
provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. 
An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected 
promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or party. 
(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to 
the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating), an attorney or 
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, 
and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, 
(b)(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; 
(b)(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by 
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law or the establishment of new law; 
(b)(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if 
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable 
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and 
(b)(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically 
so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief. 
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court 
determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the 
conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, 
or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation. 
(c)(1) How initiated. 
(c)(1)(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately 
from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to violate 
subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or 
presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or such other 
period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, 
allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court 
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may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and attorney 
fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. In appropriate circumstances, a law 
firm may be held jointly responsible for violations committed by its partners, members, 
and employees. 
(c)(1)(B) On court's initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an order 
describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an 
attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated subdivision (b) with 
respect thereto. 
(c)(2) Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall 
be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct 
by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the 
sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay 
a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an 
order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney fees 
and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation. 
(c)(2)(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for a 
violation of subdivision (b)(2). 
(c)(2)(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless the 
court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the 
claims made by or against the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned. 
(c)(2)(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct 
determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction 
imposed. 
(d) Inapplicability to discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule do not apply to 
disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions that are subject 
to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37. 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and any order 
from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the report 
of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. Judgments shall state whether they are 
entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the court's initiative; and, unless otherwise 
directed by the court, a judgment shall not include any matter by reference. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more than 
one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross 
claim, or third party claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court may 
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direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or 
parties only upon an express determination by the court that there is no just reason for 
delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such 
determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, 
that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the 
parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or 
other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment 
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(c)(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, 
every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered 
is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be 
given for or against one or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the 
case requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or 
among themselves. 
(c)(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from, or 
exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(d)(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made either in a 
statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the 
prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however, where an appeal 
or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in 
connection with such appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final 
determination of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies 
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
(d)(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days after the 
entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy 
of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the action, 
and file with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's 
knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily 
incurred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, 
within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the 
bill of costs taxed by the court. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or 
subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but 
before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served and filed on 
the date judgment is entered. 
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(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment The clerk must include in any 
judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision from the time it was 
rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must, 
within two days after the costs have been taxed or ascertained, in any case where not 
included in the judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for 
that purpose, and make a similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the 
judgment docket. 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery of attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of right in a criminal 
case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is 
either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may include single or 
double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing 
party. The court may order that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's 
attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or 
other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not 
based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An appeal, 
motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for 
any improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in the cost of 
litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or 
other paper. 
(c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its own motion. A 
party may request damages under this rule only as part of the appellee's motion for 
summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's 
response to a motion or other paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court shall issue to the 
party or the party's attorney or both an order to show cause why such damages should 
not be awarded. The order to show cause shall set forth the allegations which form the 
basis of the damages and permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise 
ordered for good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of 
oral argument. 
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the court shall 
grant a hearing. 
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Rule 40. Attorney's or party's certificate; sanctions and discipline. 
(a) Attorney's or party's certificate. Every motion, brief, and other paper of a party 
represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record who is an 
active member in good standing of the Bar of this state. The attorney shall sign his or 
her individual name and give his or her business address, telephone number, and Utah 
State Bar number. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign any motion, 
brief, or other paper and state the party's address and telephone number. Except when 
otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, motions, briefs, or other papers need 
not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The signature of an attorney or party 
constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party has read the motion, brief, or other 
paper; that to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and belief, formed after 
reasonable inquiry, it is not frivolous or interposed for the purpose of delay as defined in 
Rule 33. If a motion, brief, or other paper is not signed as required by this rule, it shall 
be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the 
attorney or party. If a motion, brief, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the 
authority and the procedures of the court provided by Rule 33 shall apply. 
(b) Sanctions and discipline of attorneys and parties. The court may, after reasonable 
notice and an opportunity to show cause to the contrary, and upon hearing, if requested, 
take appropriate action against any attorney or person who practices before it for 
inadequate representation of a client, conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar or a 
person allowed to appear before the court, or for failure to comply with these rules or 
order of the court. Any action to suspend or disbar a member of the Utah State Bar shall 
be referred to the Office of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar. 
(c) Rule does not affect contempt power. This rule shall not be construed to limit or 
impair the court's inherent and statutory contempt powers. 
(d) Appearance of counsel pro hac vice. An attorney who is licensed to practice before 
the bar of another state or a foreign country but who is not a member of the Bar of this 
state, may appear, pro hac vice upon motion, filed pursuant to the Code of Judicial 
Administration. A separate motion is not required in the appellate court if the attorney 
has previously been admitted pro hac vice in the lower tribunal, but the attorney shall 
file in the appellate court a notice of appearance pro hac vice to that effect. 
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TabB 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on March 8, 2006/ a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to 
the parties listed below: 
ERIC P HARTMAN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2558 S WILSHIRE CIRCLE 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84109 
JAMES E. MAGLEBY 
CHRISTINE T GREENWOOD 
MAGLEBY & GREENWOOD PC 
170 S MAIN STE 350 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
Dated this March 8, 2006. 
Dep^fy Clerk ~7 
Case No. 20041080 
District Court No. 940904935 
RECI -i FlVPi 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAR 0 8 2006 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
--ooOoo-
Aurora Credit Services, Inc., 
a Minnesota corporation, on 
behalf of itself and all other 
shareholders of Liberty West 
Deve1opment, a c orporatlon, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Liberty West Development, 
Inc., a Utah corporation; XM 
International, a Utah limited 
liability company; and Dennis 
W, Gay, an individual, 
Defendants and Appellees, 
ORDER 
Case No. 20041080-CA 
This matter is before the court upon Appellant's petition 
for rehearing-, filed March 6, 2006. 
Now, therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that trie petition for 
rehearing is denied. 
Dated nhis _Q__ day of March, 2006. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Carolyn B, McHugh, Judg<L^ 
